
GLADIATOR” COTTON CLAIMS 


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Copy 2 


STATEMENT OF 
MR. WILLIAM B. KING 



BEFORE THE 

COMMITTEE ON WAR CLAIMS 


HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

SIXTY-THIRD CONGRESS 
Second Session 


on 


H. R. 6066 


A BILL FOR THE RELIEF OF THE OWNERS OF CERTAIN COT¬ 
TON TAKEN BY THE UNITED STATES AUTHORITIES IN 
ADAMS COUNTY, MISS., IN 1863, AND SHIPPED 
AWAY ON THE STEAMER “GLADIATOR” 


FEBRUARY 28, 1914 




WASHINGTON 

GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 
1914 


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COMMITTEE ON WAR CLAIMS. 
House of Representatives. 


SIXTY-THIRD CONGRESS. 


A. W|. GREGG, Texas, Chairman. 


JAMES F. BYRNES, South Carolina. 
WILLIAM C. HOUSTON, Tennessee. 

C. O. LOBECK, Nebraska. 

DAVID J. LEWIS, Maryland. 

EDWIN S. UNDERHILL, New York. 
WALTER ELDER, Louisiana. 

EDWARD GILMORE, Massachusetts. 

W. R. Greg 
J. N. Davis 


FRANK PLUMLEY, Vermont. 
SAM R. SELLS, Tennessee. 

C. BASCOM SLEMP, Virginia. 

S. R. BARTON, Nebraska. 
ALBERT JOHNSON, Washington. 
CHARLES W. BELL, California. 

^ Clerk. 

Assistant Clerk. 


2 




i t j 

21 1514 


“GLADIATOR” COTTON CLAIMS. 


Committee on War Claims, 

House oe Representatives, 
Saturday, February 28 y 191 If. 

The committee was called to order at 11 o’clock a. m., Hon. A. W. 
Gregg (chairman) presiding. 

STATEMENT OF MR. WILLIAM B. KING. 

Mr. King. Mr. Chairman and gentlemen of the committee, the 
bill, TI. R. 6066, introduced by Representative Quin, of Mississippi, 
proposes to give to the Court of Claims jurisdiction to determine 
the claims of the estates of Benjamin Chase and others named for 
cotton taken by the United States in 1863 in Adams County, Miss., 
and shipped away on the steamer Gladiator , the court to proceed 
under the act of March 12, 1863, and to render judgment for the 
net proceeds in the Treasury. It is proposed to amend the bill by 
allowing all other owners of this lot of cotton to appear as well as 
those named, and to require the appearance of the claimants in 
court within one year. 

For an understanding of this bill it is necessary to explain the cap¬ 
tured and abandoned property act of March 12, 1863, and the de¬ 
cisions of the Supreme Court under it. On March 12, 1863, Con¬ 
gress passed an act known as the captured and abandoned property 
act (12 Stat. L., 820). That act authorized the collection by the 
Secretary of the Treasury of all abandoned or captured property 
in the insurrectionary States, except materials of war, and directed 
that this should be sold and the proceeds placed in the Treasury. It 
gave a right to any person whose property was taken under its pro¬ 
visions to present a claim to the Court of Claims for the return of 
the proceeds of that property in the Treasury. That claim could be 
presented any time within two years from the close of the war, and 
the owner must prove ownership and that he “ has never given any 
aid or comfort to the present rebellion.” 

Under that act a large number of claims, almost entirely for cot¬ 
ton, were presented through the Court of Claims, amounting to 
some $77,000,000, on which judgments were ultimately rendered for 
$9,852,956.95. (See Report of Chief of Miscellaneous Claims Di¬ 
vision to Secretary of the Treasury, Nov. 28, 1894, Treasury Depart¬ 
ment, Document No. 1730; Hodges v. United States, 18 C. Cls., 
703; H. Rept. 505, 62d Cong., 2d sess.) These judgments were paid 
out of the net proceeds of the cotton in the Treasury. 

The Court of Claims from the beginning required an allegation 
and proof in each case of the loyalty of the claimant. In the case 
of a northern man, named Padelford, residing in Savannah, the 
Court of Claims, after investigating his proof, declared that he was 




4 1 1 GLADIATOR ’ 1 COTTON CLAIMS. 

loyal, although he had, under threats but no immediate compulsion, 
subscribed to the Confederate loan (4 C. Cls., 316). The case was 
appealed to the Supreme Court of the United States. The Govern¬ 
ment there argued that this was an act of disloyalty. The claimant 
maintained his loyalty in fact, but urged also that he had been 
pardoned by proclamation of President Johnson and that this par¬ 
don had restored his rights if he had committed any act of dis¬ 
loyalty, and made him as though he were loyal from the beginning. 

The Chairman. Where is that case reported ? 

Mr. King. In 9 Wallace, 531. The court used the following lan¬ 
guage in that decision, page 542: 

In the case of Garland (4 Wall., 333) this court held the effect of a pardon 
to be such “ that in the eye of the law the offender is as innocent as if he had 
never committed the offense; ” and in the case of Armstrong’s Foundry (6 
Wall., 766) we held that the general pardon granted to him relieved him from 
a penalty which he had incurred to the United States. It follows that at the 
time of the seizure of the petitioner’s property he was purged of whatever 
offense against the laws of the United States he had committed by the acts 
mentioned in the findings, and relieved from any penalty which he might have 
incurred. It follows further that if the property had been seized before the 
oath was taken, the faith of the Government was pledged to its restoration 
upon the taking of the oath in good faith. 

This case was followed by a number of decisions applying the 
same rule. These are United States v. Klein (13 Wall., 128), Arm¬ 
strong v. United States (13 Wall., 154), Pargoud v. United States 
(13 Wall., 156), Carlisle v. United States (16 Wall., 147), Young v. 
United States (97 U. S., 39). In the Klein case the Supreme Court 
said (13 Wall., 142) : 

We conclude, therefore, that the title to the proceeds of the property which 
came to the possession of the Government by capture or abandonment, with the 
exceptions already noticed, was in no case divested out of the original owner. 
It was for the Government itself to determine whether these proceeds should 
be restored to the owner or not. The promise of the restoration of all rights 
of property decides that question affirmatively as to all persons who availed 
themselves of the proffered pardon. It was competent for the President to 
annex to his offer of pardon any conditions or qualifications he should see fit; 
but after those conditions and qualifications had been satisfied, the pardon and 
its connected promises took full effect. The restoration of the proceeds became 
the absolute right of the persons pardoned on application within two years 
from the close of the war. It was, in fact, promised for an equivalent. “ Par¬ 
don and restoration of political rights ” were “ in return ” for the oath and 
its fulfillment. To refuse it would be a breach of faith not less “ cruel and 
astounding” than to abandon the freed people whom the Executive had prom¬ 
ised to maintain in their freedom. 

In the Armstrong case the court said (13 Wall., 155) : 

We have recently held, in the case of the United States v. Klein, that pardon 
granted upon conditions, blots out the offense if proof is made of compliance 
with the conditions, and that the person so pardoned is entitled to the restora¬ 
tion of the proceeds of captured and abandoned property, if suit be brought 
within “ two years after the suppression of the Rebellion.” The proclamation 
of the 25th of December granted pardon unconditionally and without reserva¬ 
tion. This was a public act of which all courts of the United States are bound 
to take notice, and to which all courts are bound to give effect. The claim of 
the petitioner was preferred within two years. The Court of Claims, there¬ 
fore, erred in not giving the petitioner the benefit of the proclamation. 

In the Carlisle case the court said (16 Wall., 153) : 

After these repeated adjudications, it must be regarded as settled in this 
court that the pardon of the President, whether granted by special letters or 
by general proclamation, relieves claimants of the proceeds of captured and 


GLADIATOR ’ 9 COTTON CLAIMS. 


5 


< ( 


abandoned property from the consequences or participation in tbe rebellion, 
and from the necessity of establishing their loyalty in order to prosecute their 
claims. This result follows whether we regard the pardon as effacing the 
offense, blotting it out, in the language of the cases, as though it had never 
existed, or regard persons pardoned as excepted from the general language of 
the act, which requires claimants to make proof of their adhesion, during the 
rebellion, to the United States. 

In the Young case the court said (97 U. S., 68) : 

We have decided that the pardon closes the eyes of the courts to the offend¬ 
ing acts, or, perhaps more properly, furnishes conclusive evidence that they 
never existed as against the Government. 

The Chairman. How do you differentiate between that captured 
and abandoned property act in its requirement of loyalty and the 
Bowman Act in regard to loyalty ? 

Mr. King. The differentiation as made by the courts I will ex¬ 
plain. In the captured and abandoned property act the question of 
loyalty was a question affecting the property right. The Supreme 
Court, therefore, held that neither Congress nor the courts could 
limit the constitutional effect of a pardon by the President and 
prevent its making him as though he were loyal from the beginning. 
So far as the property right was concerned, the cotton fund was in 
its nature a trust fund. It was money derived from the sale of the 
property placed in the Treasury. 

The Chairman. How much is left of it? 

Mr. King. That is an extremely difficult question to answer. There 
are three different estimates on the subject, one made by the Court 
of Claims, of $10,512,007.96 (Hodges v. United States, 18 C. Cls., 
706; H. Kept. 505, 62d Cong., 2d sess.), and one made by the 
Treasury Department, of $4,208,398.17, stated in the report already 
mentioned. There is still another Treasury estimate of about 
$14,410,429.17, printed in House Report 1820, Fifty-third Congress, 
third session, page 25. I do not think anyone knows which is right. 

Mr. Slemp. I do not think you completed your answer to the 
chairman. 

Mr. King. No; I did not. The decision of the Supreme Court was 
that, as the act of 1863 declared loyalty a matter affecting the 
property right, so the pardon in restoring the loyalty restored the 
property right. When Congress passed the Bowman Act (22 Stat. 
L., 485) it declared, section 4, that in every claim for stores and 
supplies taken during the Civil War the claimant must allege and 
prove loyalty as a jurisdictional fact and that, if the court should 
not find him loyal, it should have no further jurisdiction and dismiss 
the petition. 

The Chairman. That was done to avoid the effect of the de¬ 
cision ? 

Mr. King. Yes, sir; because the uniform rule laid down by Con¬ 
gress in regard to claims for stores and supplies was to exclude 
those who had adhered to the Confederacy (See acts of July 4, 
1864, 13 Stat. L., 381; Mar. 3, 1871, 16 Stat/L., 524.) 

Mr. Slemp. Was that ever tested out? 

Mr. King. Yes. In the Austin case (155 U. S., 417) that ques¬ 
tion came before the Supreme Court. It could not go before the 
Supreme Court under the Bowman Act because cases under the 
Bowman Act are not appealable to the Supreme Court. In the 
Austin case the claim was for the proceeds of captured cotton. The 


6 ‘ ‘ GLADIATOR ’ ’ COTTON CLAIMS. 

Austin heirs secured the passage by Congress of a special act au¬ 
thorizing them to go into the Court of Claims. (Mar. 3, 1883, 22 
Stat. L., 804.) The bill contained the following proviso: 

Provided , however, That it be shown to the satisfaction of the court that 
neither Sterling T. Austin, sr., nor any of his surviving representatives, gave 
any aid or comfort to the late rebellion, but were throughout the war loyal 
to the Government of the United States. 

The Court of Claims found (25 C. Cls., 437) that Austin had 
not adhered consistently to the Union side. They therefore dis¬ 
missed the petition and the case went to the Supreme Court. In 
the Supreme Court it was argued for the claimants that the Padel- 
ford, Klein, Carlisle, and other cases settled the question of his 
loyalty, because, if he had been disloyal, he had been pardoned. 
The Supreme Court differentiated between property rights and the 
jurisdiction of the courts. They said (155 U. S., 432) that the 
proviso above quoted— 

* * * operated upon the entire enacting clause, and made loyalty a juris¬ 

dictional fact, since the consent to the prosecution of the suit was given upon 
the condition that that fact should be established. 

It added (p. 432): 

In declining to bestow jurisdiction in favor of pardoned offenders, whose 
claims were barred, Congress did not deny its proper constitutional effect to 
amnesty. To whom the privilege of suit should be accorded was for Congress 
alone to determine. 

But it stated (p. 432) in order to forbid any possible contention 
that this decision lessened the authority of the Klein decision: 

Undoubtedly Congress framed this act with due regard to the state of de¬ 
cision under the prior act, and hence, instead of making proof of loyalty an 
integral part of claimant’s case with his ownership of the property and his 
right to the proceeds, as in the captured and abandoned property act, it made 
the establishment of loyalty in fact, as contradistinguished from innocence in 
law produced by pardon, a prerequisite to jurisdiction. Consent to be sued was 
given on this condition. 

On these grounds, while upholding the previous decisions as to 
the effect of a pardon on claims under the captured and abandoned 
property act of March 12, 1863, the right of Congress is recognized 
to limit the jurisdiction of courts by a distinction based on loyalty 
in fact. 

In the course of the opinion, the Bowman Act was quoted (p. 429 ), 
and this statement was made in regard to it (p. 432) : 

Again it is argued that because in the fourth section of the general act of 
March 3, 1883, the fact of loyalty was stated to be “ a jurisdictional fact,” 
therefore the proviso of the Austin Act should not be construed to have that 
effect, because, while the same language was used as to the existence of 
loyalty, its establishment was not in terms expressed to be jurisdictional. But 
the structure of the two acts was different and required different treatment, 
and the special act can not properly be construed as if it were a general act 
and part of a general system and the change of phraseology in this particular 
significant. On the contrary, as we have no doubt that the effect of the proviso 
is such as we have attributed to it, we think the argument for the Government 
not unreasonable that Congress, in employing the same language in both acts 
as to the condition of loyalty, did so in effectation of a common object to be 
attained by the requirement. 

Now, in regard to the distinction, I will give a direct answer to 
the chairman’s question by saying that a distinction is made by the 
courts between loyalty as a matter of property right and loyalty as 
a matter of jurisdiction; that where it is made a property right^ the 


11 GLADIATOR 1 ’ COTTON CLAIMS. 7 

courts will consider the pardon as equivalent to loyalty; where 
it is a matter of jurisdiction, loyalty in fact must be found. 

The Chairman. Was the Austin case decided before the passage 
of the Bowman Act. 

Mr. King. No, sir; the Austin special act and the Bowman Act 
were passed on the same day. 

Mr. Slemp. How do you differentiate between claims for property 
taken from citizens who were disloyal? 

Mr. King. If the bill providing payment for claims for stores and 
supplies and giving jurisdiction to the Court of Claims to pass upon 
them was passed in the same terms as the captured and abandoned 
property act, I can not see why the decisions under the captured and 
abandoned property act should not be held to apply to those claims, 
In other words, in spite of the fact that there is some difference be¬ 
tween claims for the net proceeds of cotton in the Treasury and 
claims for stores and supplies, arising out of the fact that the cap¬ 
tured and abandoned property money is in the Treasury and consti¬ 
tutes a trust fund, I think the principle as to the effect of a pardon 
applies, and that if the courts were given the same jurisdiction ovey 
claims for stores and supplies that were given over the claims 
under the captured and abandoned property act the same result 
must follow. They have, in fact, never been given the same juris¬ 
diction. Achatever jurisdiction the Court of Claims has ever 
had in stores and supplies cases has been restricted to a finding pdf 
the facts, and, under the Bowman Act, further jurisdiction was 
denied unless a finding of loyalty was made. 

The Chairman. In other words,he was denied access to the courts? 

Mr. King. Yes. 

Mr. Slemp. You do not see any conflict between the decisions of 
courts on the subject? 

Mr. King. No. I think the Supreme Court has pointed out an 
exact line of discrimination. Now, the Court of Claims has recently 
( Lincoln, adm’r, v. United States, decided Feb. 9, 1914, not yet pub¬ 
lished), in a decision under section 161 of the Judicial Code, ap¬ 
plied the decisions of the Supreme Court as to the effect of pardon 
to claims authorized to be considered by the court for cotton taken 
after June 1, 1865. The right of presenting a claim for cotton taken 
after that date was granted to claimants by the Judicial Code of 
March 3, 1911. 

The Chairman. And the question of loyalty does not come in? 

Mr. King. No, sir. 

The Chairman. Regardless of loyalty ? 

Mr. King. They have just declared that disloyalty does not bay 
under that statute. 

The claim which I am asking the committee to consider to-day 
is of persons who do not claim to have been loyal during the war. 
They and their families participated in the rebellion. They were 
residents in the vicinity of Natchez, Miss. Their cotton was gathered 
up before the occupation of Vicksburg, along during the year 1863, 
and was shipped in one lot to Cincinnati on the steamer Gladiator. 

Mr. Lobeck. May I ask you a question? Did the Government 
troops give any receipts to these people? 

Mr. King. Not generally. It was the exception and not the rule 
when receipts were given. * This lot of cotton consisted of 1,363 bales, 
of which 351 bales belonged to the Confederate Government, for 


8 1 ‘ GLADIATOR ’ ’ COTTON CLAIMS. 

which no claim, of course, can be asserted. The total amount realized 
from the cotton, after deducting all expenses, was $361,003.04, this 
being the net proceeds in the Treasury. The share of private owners, 
leaving out the Confederate cotton, 351 bales, would be the pro¬ 
portionate part of the above net proceeds arising from the remaining 
1,012 bales, or $268,037.47. That money stands in the Treasury to 
the credit of the owners of that lot of cotton that was shipped on the 
steamer Gladiator. 

Mr. Slemp. Will you insert in the record proof of the statements 
you are making ? 

Mr. King. Yes. These are shown by records in the Court of 
Claims which we have already filed with the committee. The evi¬ 
dence on this subject is in the reports of the special commissioner of 
the Court of Claims, of which certified copies have been filed with the 
committee. 

Now, I will answer the question as to why these claimants did not 
present their claims. One of the claimants did, J. P. Ashford, and 
recovered judgment for $23,569.43 (8 C. Cls., 566). The others did 
not, because at the close of the war and until the decision of the Su¬ 
preme Court in the Padelford case, in 1870, they did not know that 
their pardon was equivalent to antecedent loyalty. The act of March 
12, 1863, gave “ two years after the suppression of the rebellion ” in 
which to sue, and the war ended on August 20, 1866, according to the 
decision of the Supreme Court in The Protector (12 Wall., 700). The 
limitation had therefore expired nearly two years before the Padel¬ 
ford decision. They had no means of knowing under this statute that 
the right had been granted to them, and they did not know. 

The Chairman. Mr. King, is that an inference or a matter of fact ? 

Mr. King. That is an inference. We have not produced any papers 
from them to show that, but it is an historic fact that those who had 
participated in the rebellion did not know that the effect of the par¬ 
don was to give them their rights under the captured and abandoned 
property act. 

The Chairman. Is there any difference in the statute, so far as 
loyalty is concerned, between the one that was paid and the ones who 
were not paid ? 

Mr. King. He alleged his loyalty when he filed his claim. Whether 
he took testimony to prove it before the decision in the Padelford 
case I could not say, but as the judgment was obtained in 1872, long 
after the decision of the Supreme Court in that case, it is not probable 
that he did. 

These other claimants say that this is ample reason for their not 
having presented their claims. This committee has in numerous past 
Congresses recognized that as a sufficient reason for repeatedly re¬ 
porting general bills to reopen the captured and abandoned property 
fund and allow all claimants to make claim for their cotton. See 
numerous reports of committees of both Houses of Congress to this 
effect. (H. Kept, 1377, 52d Cong., 1st sess.; PI. Rept. 181, 53d Cong., 
2d sess.; S. Kept. 1634, 55th Cong., 3d sess.; S. Kept, 11, 56th Cong., 
1st sess.; S. Rept. 1292, 57th Cong., 1st sess.; S. Rept. 1861, 58th 
Cong., 2d sess.; S. Rept. 3290, 59th Cong., 1st sess.; H. Rept. 1075, 
60th Cong., 1st sess.; H. Rept. 505, 62d Cong., 2d sess.) 

Mr. Slemp. Do you ask this committee to relieve these claimants 
of laches ? 


11 GLADIATOR ’ 9 COTTON CLAIMS. 9 

Mr. King. Yes, sir; but their delay could hardly be called laches, 
because it arose under peculiar circumstances, under want of knowl¬ 
edge of a difficult and novel point of constitutional law. No one 
can be accused of a want of acumen or of diligence because he did 
not anticipate these decisions of the Supreme Court. 

The Chairman. You spoke of the whole fund being about $77,- 
000,000 and that there might be $4,000,000 or $8,000,000 of it left. 
A very large number, then, did get in their claims within two years? 

Mr. King. The whole amount of claims presented in the two years 
was about $77,000,000. The judgments rendered under those $77,- 
000,000 of claims amounted to $9,852,956.95. The balance of the 
fund remaining undistributed is between $4,000,000 and $10,000,000. 
I insert here a table taken from House Report 1877, Fifty-second 
Congress, first session, reprinted in Senate Report 3290, Fifty-ninth 
Congress, first session. 

The following statement is believed to be substantially correct and will show 
the whole amount of money received into the Treasury on account of captured 
and abandoned property and the amounts paid out from time to time: 

Whole amount of abandoned and captured property sales_$31, 722, 466. 20 

Cost of collecting, sale, and other expenses_$6, 551, 000. 00 

Transferred to Freedman’s Bureau_ 243, 000. 00 

Internal-revenue taxes and commercial inter¬ 
course fees_ 1,406,000. 00 

Released to claimants by Secretaries Chase, 

Fessenden, and McCulloch_ 2, 550, 675. 24 

- 10, 750, 675. 24 


Balance covered into Treasury under resolution of Mar. 


30, 1872_ 

Paid on special acts of relief- 290,906. 32 

Paid on judgments against Treasury agents_ 64, 557. 27 

Paid on judgments under act of Mar. 12, 1863_ 9,833,423.16 

Paid by Secretary of the Treasury under act of 

May 18, 1872_ 195,896.25 

Disbursed for expenses under joint resolution of 

Mar. 30, 1868_ 75,000.00 


20, 971, 790. 96 


10, 459, 783. 00 


Balance in Treasury___ 10, 512, 007. 96 

This table is taken from the opinion of the Court of Claims in 
Hodges v. United States (18 C. Cls., 706). It is by Judge (after¬ 
wards Chief Justice) Richardson, formerly Secretary of the Treas¬ 
ury, recognized as the highest authority on all matters of Govern¬ 
ment accounting. 

The report of a subordinate Treasury official already referred to 
(Nov. 28, 1904, Treasury Department Doc. No. 1730) gives the fol¬ 
lowing statement: 

Proceeds in Treasury from all sources-$26, 887, 970. 21 

Deduct as follows: 

Premium on gold-$2, 571, 090. 25 

Profits on cotton purchased- 3, 441, 548. 09 

Amounts advanced by Treasury- 2, 445, 549. 84 

Miscellaneous property- 1, 309, 650. 69 

Rents_ 613, 2S4. 96 

Miscellaneous receipts_ 110,841.30 

Other receipts, sale of vessels, etc- 1, 438, 526. 39 

- 11, 930, 491. 52 


Leaving as cotton fund proper 


14, 957, 478. 69 



























10 


‘ 1 GLADIATOR ’ ’ COTTON CLAIMS. 


Deduct from this payment, made as stated in re¬ 
port of Feb. 14, 1889, p. 2 (the Okey report), 
as follows: 

Judgments under act Mar. 12, 1863-$9, 852, 956. 95 

Judgments against Treasury agents under 

act July 27, 1868 _ 65, 276. 79 

Disbursed as expenses under section 3, joint 
resolution Mar. 30, 1868, and subsequent 

acts_ 242,140. 34 

Paid under special acts of Congress_ 256, 766. 82 

On claims allowed by the Secretary under 

section 5, act May 18, 1872- 195, 896. 21 


$10, 613, 037,11 


Leaving of the cotton fund Feb. 14, 1889- 4, 344. 441. 58 

Since that date payments have been made as 
follows: 

Judgment Court of Claims, Duffy, Sophia B. 

(Kept. C. C., 24275)_ $15,270.00 

Newman, John H., heirs, under private act 

(25 Stat, p. 1310)_ 32,669.20 

Briggs, James M., executor C. M. Briggs, 

under private act, paid Mar. 24, 1894_ 88,104. 21 

- 136, 043. 41 


Amount in the cotton fund at this date_ 4, 208, 398.17 

Another statement was made by the Treasury Department Feb¬ 
ruary 27, 1874 (see H. Rept. 1820, 53d Cong., 3d sess., p. 25) as 
follows: 

Gross proceeds of captured and abandoned cot¬ 
ton, including premium on coin proceeds_$21,500, 000. 00 

Expenses of collection, sale, etc_ 3, 000, 000. 00 


Net proceeds_$18, 500, 000. 00 

Gross proceeds of miscellaneous property_ 1, 375, 000. 00 

Expenses of collection, sale, etc_ 86, 000. 00 


Net proceeds_ 1, 289, 000. 00 

Miscellaneous receipts, rents of abandoned houses, etc_ 1,121, 656. 44 


Total amount covered in from above sources_ 20, 910, 656. 44 

Refunded to claimants upon awards of the Court 

of Claims under section 3, act of Mar. 12,1863- $6, 300, 463. 80 


Refunded to claimants upon awards of the Secre¬ 
tary of the Treasury under section 5, act of 

May 18, 1872_ 97,734.10 

Paid for expenses, etc., under section 3, joint 

resolution of Mar. 30, 1868_^_ 75, 000. 00 

Upon judgments of United States circuit court, 

New York, under act of July 27, 1868_ 27, 029. 37 


Amounting in the aggregate to 


6, 500, 227. 27 


The balance of said fund still remaining in the Treas¬ 
ury is_ 14, 410, 429.17 

The Chairman. Was the entire amount paid out on these cotton- 
claim cases? Was the entire amount paid out by application made 
within the statutory limits, or has some money been paid out on ap¬ 
plications made subsequent ? 

Mr. King. The judgment for $9,852,956.95 were in claims filed 
during the statutory limit. A small amount was paid out under 
later special acts that Congress passed allowing claimants to go into 
































‘ i GLADIATOR ’ ’ COTTON CLAIMS. . 11 

the court or to the Treasury Department for that purpose. The 
tables above show the details. 

The Chairman. Then, as I understand, this committee has pre¬ 
cedents ? 

Mr. King. Yes; there are three or four cases in which special acts 
have been passed. 

The Chairman. Not relating to the Gladiator cases, but to other 
cases ? 

Mr. King. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Underhill. What was the value of the cotton seized belonging 
to the Confederacy ? 

Mr. King. The Treasury report already referred to says that this 
was $4,690,774.79. 

Mr. Underhill. Was that on the basis of the one estimate you 
spoke of ? All the private cotton has been paid for and distributed ? 

Mr. King. That is the claim made in the report of the Treasury 
Department referred to. 

Mr. Underhill. I want to inquire whether this cotton fund is in 
the general fund of the Treasury, or whether it is is in a distinct fund 
by itself ? 

Mr. King. It is kept in a distinct fund, as a matter of bookkeeping. 
In 1868 it was found that the Secretary of the Treasury had been 
exercising what he believed to be a lawful discretion in doing what 
he called “ restoring ” captured cotton to the owners. Congress 
thought jurisdiction should be limited to the Court of Claims, and 
thereupon Congress passed an act covering the fund into the Treas¬ 
ury, but it is still referred to officially as the captured and abandoned 
property fund. 

The Chairman. And there is a separate account kept of it ? 

Mr. King. Yes; that sufficiently appears from the extracts from 
the official reports which I have inserted in the records. 

Now, I was going on to say why these claims embraced in the pend¬ 
ing bill, H. R. 6066, should have special consideration. We have 
shown that there was a special fund that came from this particular 
lot of cotton. This committee has previously reported general bills 
for all such claims, but these bills have never got any further than 
the calendar, for some reason. I do not know what the reasons are. 
but undoubtedly the House has not passed the general bills. 

Since the justice of the claims has been repeatedly recognized by 
reporting the general bills; since the House has heretofore declined 
to pass the general bills; and since there is a special fund in the 
Treasury derived from the sale of this particular cotton, then we ask 
the committee to do justice measurably to us by permitting these 
particular claimants to have a special bill allowing them to go to the 
Court of Claims. 

The Chairman. Is that not a discrimination in their favor? 

Mr. King. I think it will be fair to discriminate in favor of any 
particular claimants who may come to you and make a showing that 
there is one particular unused fund in the Treasury arising from the 
sale of their cotton, out of which they ask payment. If anyone else 
comes along with a parallel case I should say that they should be 
entitled to it also. 


12 i ( GLADIATOR * ’ COTTON CLAIMS. 

Mr. Slemp. There is no discrepancy between the amount of money 
in the so-called trust fund and the amount of legitimate claims, is 
there ? 

Mr. King. That is a very complicated and difficult matter to de¬ 
termine, and it would only be after a very careful computation by 
Treasury experts and court officers that these questions could be 
settled. There are complications that have arisen growing out of 
the payment of claims from the cotton funds. In this particular 
case no such question can arise because the Government seized this 
cotton. It was sold by the Government and the money is in the 
Treasury as a trust fund, a particular fund derived from the sale of 
this cotton to cover these claims. 

Mr. Underhill. Do you not understand the Austin case to decide 
that the claimant must prove loyalty in fact, and that the general 
proclamation is not sufficient ? 

Mr. King. It decides that, under the language of the statute in 
that particular instance, the claimant was obliged to prove loyalty 
in fact, as a test of jurisdiction under the statute. 

Mr. Underhill. A special act authorizing the heirs to sue? 

Mr. King. Yes; a special act. 

Mr. Underhill. And that grows out of the wording of that special 
act? 

Mr. King. Yes. The opinions of the Supreme Court declare a 
discrimination between the Austin special act and the Bowman act 
on the one hand and the captured and abandoned property act on 
the other. These claims are under the captured and abandoned 
property act. 

Mr. Underhill. The decision seems to indicate that they required 
absolute loyalty in fact. 

Mr. King. Let me read some extracts from the decisions of the 
Supreme Court in the Austin case. Referring to the proviso in the 
Austin special act it said (155 U. S., 432), that it— 

* * * operated upon the entire enacting clause and made loyalty a juris¬ 

dictional fact, since the consent to the prosecution of the suit was given upon 
the condition that that fact should be established. 

Then the court discriminated between this Austin and the cap¬ 
tured and abandoned property act by saying: 

Undoubtedly Congress framed this act with due regard to the state of 
decision under the prior act, and hence, instead of making proof of loyalty 
an integral part of claimant’s case with his ownership of the property and his 
right to the proceeds, as in the captured and abandoned property act, it made 
the establishment of loyalty in fact, as contradistinguished from innocence in 
law produced by pardon, a prerequisite to jurisdiction. Consent to be sued 
was given only on this condition. 

Mr. Lewis. This committee meeting, I believe, is called specially 
to consider the Frederick City (Md.) war claims, and if Mr. King 
has presented his claim substantially I think we should go on. 

Mr. Johnson. I suppose we will have to adjourn pretty soon, and 
I move that Mr. King be allowed to complete his statement in the 
time we have. 

Mr. King. I think that is all I have to say, unless the committee 
have some further questions they wish to ask. 

Mr. Slemp. What is the amount of this claim ? 

Mr. King. Something over $250,000. 


‘ ‘ GLADIATOR ” COTTON CLAIMS. 13 

Mr. Slemp. Will you put in the record the exact amount ? 

Mr. King. Yes. 

Total cotton taken!---bales__ 1, 363 

Confederate cotton included in this_do_ 351 

Balance is private cotton_clo_ 1, 012 

Total fund derived from the sale of this cotton__!_$361, 003. 04 

Proportionate share due to 1,012 bales_$268, 037. 47 

Judgment paid to J. P. Ashford (8 C. Cls., 566)_ 23 ? , 569. 43 

Balance claimed__ 244, 468. 04 


Mr. Lobeck. And the basis of your claim is that this very cotton 
was shipped on board the Gladiator , and that the proceeds from the 
sale thereof were put into a trust fund to pay these people if they 
were entitled to it ? 

Mr. King. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Slemp. Do you absolutely trace that particular cotton into the 
trust fund? 

Mr. King. Yes; the papers that we have in the records of the Court 
of Claims, and we think the records show that it was absolutely this 
cotton. I would like to ask that the papers which I have submitted 
be filed with my statement so that they can go into the statement as 
a part of the record. 

The Chairman. Very well; that can be done. 

Mr. King. I thank you very much, gentlemen. 

(Thereupon the committee proceeded to the consideration of other 
business. 

The following are the papers mentioned:) 

Statement in Support of a Bill for the Relief of the Owners of Certain 

Cotton Taken by the United States Authorities in Adams County, 

Miss., in 1863 and Shipped Away on the Steamer “ Gladiator.” 

This bill proposes to give jurisdiction to the Court of Claims to hear and 
determine the claims of Benjamin Chase and others for cotton taken by the 
United States authorities in Adams County, Miss., in. 1863. These are claims 
arising under the captured and abandoned property act of March 12, 1863 (12 
Stat. L., 820). The original claimants were planters who raised considerable 
cotton in the years 1861 and 1862, but owing to the blockade they were unable 
to ship it out of the Confederacy. It remained on their plantations, not far 
from Natchez, Miss., until early in the year 1863, when the prospect of Federal 
occupation of the country obliged them, under military orders, to remove the 
cotton farther back from the Mississippi River. 

Upon the occupation of Natchez, Miss., by the United States forces, military 
parties were sent to search for cotton, and the place of storage of this cotton 
was found, the cotton taken by military officers, delivered at Natchez, and from 
there shipped to Vicksburg on the steamer Gladiator, and afterwards trans¬ 
mitted to Memphis and turned over by the military authorities to the agents 
of the Treasury Department. The quantity was 1,363 bales. The cotton was 
sold at public auction, and the proceeds of it are now in the Treasury. 

A claim was filed by the estate of J. P. Ashford, one of the owners of the 
cotton so taken, within the time limited by the act of March 12, 1863, two years 
from the close of the Civil War. A judgment was rendered in favor of his 
administrator by the Court of Claims for $23,569.43. (Vol. 8, Cl Cls. R., 
p. 566.) 

The other owners of this cotton did not file any claims for it, because the 
act of March 12, 1863, made proof of loyalty to the United States throughout 
the Civil War a condition to the recovery of the net proceeds in the Treasury. 

The Supreme Court of the United States, at the December term, 1869, de¬ 
cided in United States v. Padelford (9 Wall., 531) that the pardon granted to 
claimant in that case by the President of the United States after the close of 
the war relieved him from all offense arising from acts of disloyalty and made 












14 “gladiator” cotton claims. 

him “ as innocent as if he had never commited the offense.” The Supreme 
Court said (p. 543) : 

“ It follows further that if the property had been seized before the oath was 
taken, the faith of the Government was pledged to its restoration upon the 
taking of the oath in good faith. We can not doubt that the petitioner’s right 
to the property in question, at the time of the seizure, was perfect, and that it 
remains perfect, notwithstanding the seizure.” 

In a later case, United States v. Klein (13 Wall., 128), the Supreme Court 
said further on this point (p. 142) : 

“ We conclude, therefore, that the title to the proceeds of the property which 
came to the possession of the Government by capture or abandonment, with the 
exceptions already noticed, was in no case divested out of the original owner. 
It was for the Government itself to determine whether these proceeds should 
be restored to the owner or not. The promise of the restoration of all rights 
of property decides that question affirmatively as to all persons who availed 
themselves of the proffered pardon. It was competent for the President to 
annex to his offer of pardon any conditions or qualifications he should see fit; 
but after those conditions and qualifications had been satisfied, the pardon 
and its connected promises took full effect. The restoration of the proceeds 
became the absolute right of the persons pardoned on application within two 
years from the close of the war. It was, in fact, promised for an equivalent. 
* Pardon and restoration of political rights ’ were ‘ in return ’ for the oath and 
its fulfillment. To refuse it would be a breach of faith not iess 4 cruel and 
astonding ’ than to abandon the freed people whom the Executive had promised 
to maintain in their freedom.” 

Applying these decisions of the Supreme Court, the right of these claimants 
to the net proceeds in the Treasury of their cotton becomes clear. The money 
in the Treasury is held as a trust in their favor, and payment was due to them 
upon pardon. Unfortunately, the decision of the Supreme Court in the case 
first cited was not rendered until more than two years after the “ suppression 
of the rebellion,” the period limited by the act of March 12, 1863, for the presen¬ 
tation of the claims. They therefore found themselves when this decision was 
rendered with an admitted right, but with no remedy available. 

General bills for the relief of this class of claimants have been pending 
before Congress for many years, and have repeatedly been reported favorably 
by the committees in both Houses of Congress. In the Fifty-sixth Congress 
Senate bill 3684 for the relief of these claimants was referred to the Court of 
Claims under the provisions of section 14 of the act of March 3, 1887, com¬ 
monly called the Tucker Act (24 Stat. L., 505). Upon the presentation of peti¬ 
tions to the Court of Claims under this reference, congressional case No. 10110, 
the claims were dismissed from jurisdiction by the court on the ground that the 
bill referred was not sufficiently specific in naming the claimants. 

A second reference was made in the Sixtieth Congress of Senate bill 5522, 
in which the claimants were named, and a motion to dismiss the petitions 
was allowed on the ground that the Court of Claims had no jurisdiction under 
this act of 1887 to claims for captured and abandoned property arising under the 
act of March 12, 1863. 

A very strong dissenting opinion upon this point was filed by Judge Howry 
and a second opinion upon a motion for rehearing. (See Brandon, adminis¬ 
trator, v. United States, 46 C. Cls., 559; 47 C. Cls., 403.) 

A careful examination of these two opinions shows very strong ground for 
the dissent on the part of Judge Howry. His opinion plainly shows that the 
court reversed a carefully considered decision in an earlier case, admitting a 
claim under the act of March 12, 1863, to jurisdiction under the act of 1887. 

The claimants now ask that Congress grant them special relief and permit 
them to sue in the Court of Claims, notwithstanding their failure to apply 
to that court within two years from the close of the Civil War. The reasons 
for asking the waiver of the statute of limitations in their favor is that the 
decision of the Supreme Court declaring that a pardon was sufficient proof of 
loyalty under the act of March 12, 1S63, was not made in time for them to 
obtain the benefit of that act. 

Section 162 of the Judicial Code of March 3, 1911, grants the same right 
to one class of cotton claimants under the act of 1863, to wit, those whose 
claims originated after June 1, 1S65. The relief here asked rests upon the 
same principle as that granted by this section. 

A special reason why relief should be granted as provided by this bill is 
shown by the records of the Court of Claims in a report made by the special 


gladiator” cotton claims. 


15 


i i 


commissioner of that court charged with the investigation of cotton claims 
undei the act of March 12, 18(33, in which it appears that the cotton taken in 
and aiound Natchez, Miss., has been traced into the Treasury, and that the 
money for the payment of the claims embraced in this bill stands to the credit 
of the claimants who can prove their title to it. 

These claimants took a large amount of testimony under the rules of the 
Court of Claims before their petitions were dismissed showing very clearly 
that their cotton was a portion of the cotton making up the lot of 1,363 bales 
reported by this special commissioner. Extracts from this report and the order 
of the court approving them accompany this statement. 

[United States Court of Claims. December term, 1874.] 

Sundry Cotton Cases. 


SECOND REPORT OE SPECIAL COMMISSIONER. 


In pursuance of the order of this court, dated on the 4th day of June, 1873, 
appointing me a special commissioner for certain purposes therein set forth, I 
submit the above-entitled causes and the following report, embracing transac¬ 
tions in regard to cotton captured in the State of Mississippi during the years 
1863, 1864, and 1865, the records not exhibiting any captured in the year 1862. 
****** * 

FIRST FUND. 

The most of the cotton included in this report was captured in the vicinity of 
Vicksburg, Miss., and was transported to that city. From there it was shipped 
generally to Memphis, Tenn., and thence to St. Louis and Cincinnati for sale. 

The collection of cotton in that locality began in June, 1863, about the time 
the Army surrounded the city of Vicksburg, and continued until about July, 
1865. A very large quantity of captured cotton was used by the Army of the 
United States for defensive purposes in the vicinity of Vicksburg. After the 
surrender of Vicksburg this cotton, or as much of it as could be saved, was col¬ 
lected and transported to Vicksburg. The work of gathering cotton from the 
defenses around Vicksburg continued until about the 1st of November, 1863, and 
after that date small quantities were received, and even as late as March, 1864, 
a few bales were dug out and brought in from those defenses. 

The testimony shows that during the strife in the counties surrounding Vicks¬ 
burg the people were in the habit of concealing their cotton in swamps and 
forests to protect it from the torches of the Confederates and also from the hands 
of the Union Army. During the latter part of the year 1863 and during the 
year 1864 much of this concealed cotton was discovered by the military forces 
of the United States and by the Treasury officials, and whs seized and conveyed 
by them to Vicksburg and Natchez. 

Neither the records of the department nor the depositions of witnesses filed 
in the various cases enable me to determine how long the various lots of cotton 
remained in Vicksburg before shipment to the North for sale. But I find that 
large masses of cotton were stored in warehouses and piled up on wharves in 
Vicksburg for indefinite periods of time, and I am led to the belief that large 
quantities of cotton were retained in Vicksburg many months before shipment 
to Memphis, St. Louis, and Cincinnati. 

I find that a large quantity of cotton was, immediately after seizure, sent to 
Natchez, but the greater part, if not all, of such cotton was reshipped, sooner 
or later, to Vicksburg; at this point it was intermingled with the mass of cotton 
accumulated in that city, except as to lot 121, hereinafter mentioned. 

******* 


Respectfully submitted to the honorable Court of Claims by 

E. Eveleth, Commissioner. 


Washington, D. C., March 2, 1875. 


******* 
Reported November 1, 1863. 

1863.—Record lot 121, 1,363 bales of captured cotton, various marks. 

This lot was shipped August 31 from Vicksburg, Miss, (but supposed to have 
been forwarded from Natchez to Vicksburg), by Capt. G. L. Foot, A. Q. M., 
Vicksburg, on the steamer Gladiator, consigned to Capt. A. R. Eddy, A. Q. M., 



V 


36 


‘ ‘ GLADIATOR ’ ’ COTTON CLAIMS. 


Memphis, and by him turned over to the Treasury Department at Memphis,. 
l,343i bales. After being repaired by the Treasury Department, it made 1,363 
bales. The same was turned over to this department as cotton captured or 
seized by the military authorities, as per my receipts given. 

The following is all the old marks that was on the same when received: 
C. S. A., 351; est. J. P. Ashford, 63; H. C. Hase, 2; Deer Park, 61; Springfield, 
15; E. P. B., 7; L. A. Grier, 3; John Minor, 1; B. Chase, 9; H. T., 1. 

No further history is known in regard to this lot. The same was shipped 
by Special Agent Yeatman to Supervising Special Agent Mellen, Cincinnati, as 
follows: 

Bales. 


Sept. 8, shipped on steamer Lady Franklin _ 400 

Sept. 8, shipped on steamer Norman _ 400 

Sept. 11, shipped on steamer Jewess _ 100 

Sept. 15, shipped on steamer Sunshine _ 463 


Total____ 1,363 

This last lot was shipped to Cincinnati, via Cairo, care of D. Arter, Cairo; 
from Cairo to Cincinnati by rail; freight and charges as follows, to wit: 

Paid W. H. Thomson & Co., Government warehouse agents, as per 

bill rendered__$2, 702. 65 

Quartermaster’s Department on same (1,3431 bales) as per bill ren¬ 
dered, at $10 per bale_ 13, 437. 50 


Received. 


16,140.15 
Th. H. Yeatman, 

Assistant Special Agent, Treasury Department. 


1863. September 21. Sold at public auction, after due notice and publica¬ 
tion, a portion of lot 121, consisting of 400 bales, received p. Lady Franklin , 


as p. foregoing record, as follows: 

****** * 

400 bales, 176,306_-_$111,989.32 

Charges _ 14, 895. 59 


Net proceeds__ 97, 093. 73 

******* 
October 19. Sold at public auction, after due notice and publication, a 
portion of lot 121, consisting of 960 bales: 

****** * 

960 bales, weighing 397,120-$303, 053. 30 

Charges - 39,143. 99 


263, 909. 31 

****** * 
Reported February 1, 1864. 


November 16. Sold at public auction, after due notice and publication: 


3 bales cotton left over from last sale. 

1 less, stolen or lost. 

2 bales sold J. Gotlieb, weighing 422,278=700 at 43_$301. 00 

Charges _ 44. 47 


Net proceeds- 256. 53 


In addition to the foregoing, it is stated by Lieut. J. E. Jones, acting assist¬ 
ant quartermaster, United States Army, in voucher No. 46 of abstract E of his 
property returns for the month of September, 1S63, that he was ordered by 
Col. Bingham to receive this cotton and forward it to Memphis; that he never 
receipted for it, and “ that Lieut. Nichols was the man who shipped it from 
Natchez, Miss.” 

Information of the date at which Lieut. Nichols shipped this cotton from 
Natchez, or of the source whence he obtained it, can not be supplied, since it is 
not furnished in returns rendered by Lieut. Jones, and if Lieut. Nichols ever 
























* 1 GLADIATOR ’ 9 COTTON CLAIMS. 17 

rendered any property returns accounting for this cotton they are not on tile 
in the Treasury Department nor in the Office of the Quartermaster General of 
the Army. 

On the 31st of August, 1863, Lieut. Jones transferred this cotton to Capt. G. L. 
Fort. A. Q. M., who shipped it from Vicksburg, Miss., on the steamer Gladiator — 
the steamer on which it was shipped from Natchez—consigned to Capt. J. V. 
Lewis, A. Q. M., at Memphis, Tenn., by whom it was transferred to the Treas¬ 
ury agent, Mr. Thomas H. Yeatman. 

******* 
Extract from the order of the court of May 24, 1875, to wit: 

“And it is further ordered that the engrossed and consolidated copy of the 
reports of the commissioner as amended by this order, filed herewith, stand as 
the findings of fact of the court.” 

United States of America, ss: 

I, John Randolph, assistant clerk of the Court of Claims, do hereby certify 
that the foregoing sheets numbered from 1-5 are a true copy of extracts from 
the consolidated report of Commissioner Evan Eveleth, filed in said court May 
24. 1S75, and of the order of the court upon said report, dated May 24, 1875. 
Witness my hand and the seal of this court this 15th day of May, 1913. 

[seal.] John Randolph, 

* Assistant Clerk Court of Claims . 

32759—14-2 


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